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WHAT DEFINES A PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY? AN ANALYSIS OF THE
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND
THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE
INJURY A CT: THE NEED FOR PRE VENTION




The United States' childhood immunization program has been
admired as one of the nation's most successful public health initiatives.
Relatively low cost and mass utilization of vaccinations have made
immunization an essential component in the nation's medical care
system. Yet, the very industry charged with caring for the nation's
children has been compromised by unforeseen flaws within its
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1. Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and
Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1854 (1995)
("Over a period of fifty years, the United States has dramatically reduced the
annual occurrence of polio, whooping cough, and measles.").
2. Robin J. Strongin, U.S. Childhood Vaccine Availability: Legal, Regulatory,
and Economic Complexities, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM ISSUE BRIEF No.
785, 2 (November 15, 2002) ("Vaccines have been heralded as one of the most
cost-effective public health and biomedical success stories. Protecting against
once-dreaded diseases ranging from polio to diphtheria, they are a staple of most
U.S. children's routine medical care.").
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infrastructure? Of particular concern are vaccine shortages. Terror
concerns after September 11, 2001 have only added to the need for
stable immunization protection. Recent congressional and agency
actions have shown that the government recognizes that there are
childhood immunization issues in the United States that require a
response, and that vaccine stockpiling is an effective solution to the
problem.6
Fear of litigation has created a shortage in vaccine production,
compromising child immunization. Congress responded to the vaccine
shortage by enacting legislation to entice private manufacturers to
8reenter the vaccine market. Experts, however, are skeptical and wanta more comprehensive solution involving federal, state, and private
3. Id. at 4 (stating that shortages of vaccines have "undermine[d] the nation's
ability to protect the health of its citizens"). The Brief states that there are other
contributing factors to the dangers of public health crisis, including bioterrorism,
fears about vaccine safety, and "herd immunity" (where parents rely on the
community to be immune instead of vaccinating their own child). Id. at 3. The
Brief also states that "[m]any health officials are concerned that the very success of
vaccine programs actually may contribute to their downfall." Id.
4. Id. at 4 ( "Recent shortages have made it particularly difficult for
physicians and other health providers to keep track of who has been vaccinated
and who requires follow-up."). See also NAT'L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM.,
STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY OF ROUTINELY RECOMMENDED VACCINES IN THE
UNITED STATES: A REPORT 1 (2003) (stating "[a]n unprecedented and
unanticipated shortage of routinely recommended vaccines occurred in the United
States... ").
5. See Strongin, supra note 2, at 2 ("The post-September 11 environment, in
which the specter of potential bioterror agents such as anthrax and smallpox looms
large, has expanded concerns over the nation's vaccine infrastructure from the
largely pediatric arena to the realm of homeland security.").
6. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2004).
7. Vaccine production was compromised by a combination of frivolous
lawsuits, legitimate liability claims, and malpractice insurance issues. See S. REP.
No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6345 ("[A]s a result of this
increase in litigation ...[t]he number of childhood vaccine manufacturers has
declined significantly."). See also NAT'L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 4,
at 7 (regarding "[p]roblems of Vaccine Supply in 2001-2002 ... [t]he categories of
factors leading to the vaccine supply shortages are two-fold...").
8. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 (2003) ("The
Secretary shall establish in the Department of Health and Human Services a
National Vaccine Program to achieve optimal prevention of human infectious
diseases through immunization and to achieve optimal prevention against adverse
reactions to vaccines. The Program shall be administered by a Director selected by
the Secretary.").
2004] Prevention of Nonterror National Medical Emergencies 139
entities.9  This more expansive, coordinated approach should be
adopted by Congress through statute.
Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 (NCVIA) in response to vaccine supply shortages and a
destabilization of childhood immunization. 0 The NCVIA charged the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) with the task of
overseeing vaccination in the United States through initiatives such as
the National Vaccine Program.11 In the early 1990s, with the danger of
terrorism looming, President Clinton issued a presidential decision
directive ordering HHS to commence the stockpiling of vaccines for
terror-related threats.12
In 2002, the focus on terrorism threats brought about major
realignment to the infrastructure of the U.S. government.
3 Among
many other changes, the administration of government vaccine
stockpiling for terror threats shifted from HHS to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).14 HHS, however, retained control over
vaccine stockpiling for non-terror-related purposes, 15 splitting authority
of vaccine stockpiling between the two administrative agencies.
9. NAT'L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 4, at 18 (2003) ("Current
efforts to encourage appropriate use of vaccines should be amplified by a
coordinated program involving government, industry, academia, professional
societies, and consumers to emphasize the value of recommended vaccines for the
individual and the community.").
10. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (1986).
11. Id.
12. Presidential Decision Directive-62, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 21 (May
22, 1998) [hereinafter PDD-62]. The full text of PDD-62 is a classified document.
13. See Daniel A. Cotter, The Homeland Security Act of 2002: A Federal
Response to September 11th, 17-MAR CHICAGO BAR ASS'N REC. 37 (2003) ("The
Act restructures the executive branch of the Federal Government, moving all or
parts of the 22 existing agencies to the Department, in an effort to more effectively
meet the threat to our homeland posed by terrorism.").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2004). The Secretary of HHS lost autonomous
control of terror-related stockpiling to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. Under the Project Bioshield Act, the secretary of Health and
Human Services maintains the stockpile, and the secretary of Homeland Security
has a secondary, coordinating position. See Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). Cf Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (2003).
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Despite the work of HHS, vaccine shortages and a decline in childhood
immunization remain critical problems in the United States. 6
This Comment first discusses the federal government's response to
vaccine shortages caused by market failures in the vaccine industry and
specifically to the vaccine supply shortage of 1991. The focus of this
Comment then turns to the federal government's response to terror-
related public health emergencies, the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile. This Comment then traces the evolution of the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile from its inception under the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to its new form as the
Strategic National Stockpile, and the role the Department of
Homeland Security plays in its administration. This Comment then
explains how this evolution has affected childhood vaccine stockpiling
initiatives. This Comment then analyzes recent federal vaccine
stockpiling legislation in light of the Supreme Court's view of statutory
interpretation by administrative agencies. This Comment further
analyzes the need for stockpiling in non-terror-related public health
emergencies, and discusses how administrative agencies have proposed
to fulfill this need. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Strategic
National Stockpile should be a model for government prevention of
non-terror-related national medical emergencies and that Congress
should implement childhood immunization stockpiling initiatives
through statute.
I. RESPONSE TO DANGER: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S REACTION
TO VACCINE INJURY AND SHORTAGE
The federal government has reacted to vaccine shortages by enacting
legislation providing for the uninsured and conducting studies that
identify the problem.17  In each action, Congress and HHS
acknowledged vaccine stockpiling as an effective solution; however,
the federal government has never formally created an effective child
immunization stockpiling program through statute."
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. Id.
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A. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
The government's initial response to vaccine shortages was to
protect the vaccine industry from lawsuits. An increase in lawsuits
during the 1970s concerning injuries by the diphtheria, pertussis, and
tetanus vaccines led to large damage awards for victims' tort claims. 9
Many manufacturers stopped producing vaccines because due to
increased liability.20  Simultaneously, states began enacting
immunization laws that required parents to have their children
vaccinated before entering school.21  Soon many essential vaccines
were in short supply leading Congress to respond to the increased risk
of epidemic disease 22 by enacting the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986. 23 The NCVIA evidenced Congress' intent to
stabilize the private vaccine industry through two federal
immunization initiatives,24 the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
and the National Vaccine Program.2'
The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program gave victims harmed by
adverse reactions to vaccination alternatives to litigation, including
immediate compensation based on government-regulated injury• • 26
determinations. Such compensation was given without determining
causation on a case-by-case basis, and without having to show
27
negligence on the part of the manufacturer. A "Vaccine Injury
19. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, National Vaccine Program:
Overview of Vaccine Safety, at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe. See also Freed et
al, Safety of Vaccinations: Miss America, the Media, and Public Health. 276 (23)
JAMA 1869-1872 (1996).
20. Freed et al., supra note 19.
21. S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6346.
22. Id.
23. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (2003).
See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6344
(stating that the Act "creates a new system for compensating individuals who have
been injured by vaccines routinely administered to children").
24. S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6345 ("The
number of childhood vaccine manufacturers has declined significantly... [this] has
led to the Committee's re-evaluation of all current vaccine and vaccine-related
activities.").
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (2003).
26. Id.
27. See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287,
6353 ("While this bill does not prohibit a vaccine-injured person who has
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Table" was placed within the statute listing vaccines and symptoms
necessary to receive compensation from the federal government.2
This compensation added an incentive for manufacturers to produce
vaccines by shielding them from the potential costs of product liability
litigation.
The National Vaccine Program was created upon what Congress
characterized as "advances in biotechnology that could lead to the
production of new and improved vaccines, as well as the lack of
organization at the Federal [level] in the promotion and use of
vaccines."30 The NCVIA placed the program under HHS control31 and
gave the Director of the National Vaccine Program several
responsibilities, including: 1) coordinating and providing direction for
vaccine research; 2) ensuring the safety of vaccines; 3) managing the
testing, licensing, production, and procurement of vaccines; and 4)
overseeing the distribution and use of vaccines.32 To accomplish these
completed compensation proceedings from going on to court, the system is
intended to lessen the number of lawsuits against manufacturers.").
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14.
The following is a table of vaccines, the injuries, disabilities,
illnesses, conditions, and deaths resulting from the
administration of such vaccines, and the time period in which the
first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant
aggravation of such injuries, disabilities, illnesses, conditions,
and deaths is to occur after vaccine administration for purposes
of receiving compensation under the Program.
Id.
29. See supra note 27. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (for how compensation
program was structured and administered). See also 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 20
(2004) ("The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ('NVICP') exists
both to provide compensation to injured vaccines and also to shield the vaccine
industry from excessive and unpredictable liability."). The statutory structure of
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program can be contrasted with policy based
compensation, such as the September 11, 2001 Compensation Fund. See Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 405 (2003)
("There has been a recent surge of interest in the concept of damages funds,
prompted in large part by their utilization in successful class action settlements and
by the existence of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001.").
30. S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6349.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1. See also 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (the enabling statute of
HHS).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2. See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6351 ("The National Vaccine Program will be responsible for
determining the vaccine supply needs of the United States.").
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ends, the NCVIA required the Director to work with a number of
government agencies including the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and
the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Biologics Research and
Review. The NCVIA also charged the Director with allocating
funding among the various agencies for the implementation of a
vaccine plan)4
The NCVIA provides explicit direction for implementing vaccine
initiatives,35 including the preparation of an annual vaccine plan and
the establishment of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee
(NVAC), 6 The plan was established to designate priorities within the
National Vaccine Program, provide a roadmap to agency coordination,
and describe the optimal use of resources. 7 Additionally, the NCVIA
authorized the NVAC to perform a number of functions. It charged
the NVAC to assist the Director in the implementation of the vaccine
plan. 8 It also placed responsibility upon the NVAC to recommend
research priorities to encourage availability and adequate supply and
to assist in devising a plan to make a "supply of safe and effective
vaccination products" available to the states.39 The structure of the
NCVIA required coordination not only within the designated federal
agencies, the NVAC, and the Director, but also between the state and
federal governments. 40 This coordination was essential to create
33. 42 U.S.C. 300aa-2. See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6352 ("The National Vaccine Program would constitute the
central focus in the Federal government for gathering and analyzing information
about non-government vaccine and immunization activities.").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2. See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6352 ("These funds would be made available during the year
that the Plan is in force to make sure that the failure of one agency to meet an
objective does not cripple the whole national vaccine effort.").
35. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1-5.
36. Id. § 300aa-3-5.
37. Id. § 300aa-3. See also S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6352 ("The annual production of the Plan is to be an integral
part of the ongoing process for coordinating and providing direction to
collaborating agencies.").
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-3.
39. Id. § 300aa-5.
40. S. REP. No. 99-380 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6346
("Over the years, State government has become an important adjunct in carrying
out the Federal government's responsibility to prevent the spread of infectious
diseases."). The Vaccine Act was able to stop production woes in the industry and
allow reentry into the vaccine market. Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine
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solutions, albeit temporary ones, to immunization shortfalls. However,
while Congress attempted to address these problems, their actions
were inconsistent and did not provide proper guidance and support for
childhood immunization shortfalls.
B. The Vaccine Supply Shortage of 1991: Implementation of a Vaccine
Stockpile
Despite the enactment of the NCVIA, the United States
41experienced other shortages in vaccines for children. Many experts
concluded the shortage was caused by a combination of burdensome
government regulations and the rising costs of producing vaccines.
Others contended that the reemergence of personal injury tort claims
and production difficulties were responsible.43 Congress attempted to
alleviate the problem by authorizing the creation and maintenance of a
vaccine stockpile in 1982; however, funding was pulled in 1991 due to
the recession." During its nine-year existence, the vaccine stockpile
was effectively used seven times.45
By 1993, health care reform and child welfare became central issues
of President Clinton's domestic policy agenda."'  The Clinton
administration proposed that the government provide childhood
Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C.L. REv. 371,
373-374 (2002) ("The statute helped stabilize the pediatric vaccine market .... ).
41. See Noah, supra note 40, at 374 ("This sort of thing has happened before.
In the mid-1980s, manufacturers of pediatric vaccines dramatically increased the
prices of their products or left the market altogether.").
42. Spencer Rich, Child Vaccine Shortage Seen at Health Centers; Group
Disputes HHS on Low Immunization, WASH. POST, May 22, 1991, at A03. HHS
argued that there was a six-month supply, and the real problem was people not
coming in. Id. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO-02-987,
Childhood Vaccines: Ensuring an Adequate Supply Poses Continuing Challenges,
14-19 (2002).
43. See Noah, supra note 40, at 374.
44. David C. Mowery & Voilaine Mitchell, Improving the Reliability of the U.S.
Vaccine Supply: An Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 973,
991 (1995) ("Although the existing twenty-four-week stockpile of the six vaccines
previously listed ha[d] been maintained, no new vaccines . . . have been
stockpiled.").
45. Id.
46. Id. at 996.
2004] Prevention of Nonterror National Medical Emergencies 145
47
vaccines at no charge through a universal purchase program.
Congress, however, did not approve of no-cost vaccines. Eventually a
compromise was reached and inserted within the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.48 Under the compromise, no-cost pediatric
vaccines were provided for those children who were uninsured or on
Medicaid. 49 The legislation also required the Secretary of HHS to
stockpile pediatric vaccines that may be unavailable for purchase or
delivery.0  While the legislation provided for expanded CDC
purchases of vaccines at a negotiated price, it also linked future
increases in the cost of vaccines to the rate of inflation. This ultimately
proved to be an ineffective provision as the economy was stable and
inflation remained flat throughout the 1990s, thereby allocating less
money for the government to buy vaccines." As a result, vaccine
shortfalls and childhood immunization concerns continued for the
remainder of the decade.52
C. It's Not Over: The Government Acknowledges the Continued
Problem of Vaccine Shortages
The federal government again acknowledged a vaccine shortage in a
report issued by the NVAC in January of 2003.
53 HHS requested that
the report evaluate vaccine supply shortages and recommend ways to
strengthen the supply.54 The report found an "unprecedented and
47. Id.
48. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The relevant portions of
the Act concerning vaccines were codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396s (2003).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s.
50. Id. § 1396s(a)(2)(b) ("To the extent that a sufficient quantity of vaccine is
not available for purchase or delivery . . . the Secretary shall provide for the
purchase and delivery ... with priority given to federally vaccine-eligible children
unless the Secretary finds there are other public health considerations.").
51. Mowery & Mitchell, supra note 44, at 996 ("[B]ut this legislation seems
likely to do little to expand the sources of supply of existing vaccines, for which
future price growth is capped.").
52. Id.
53. The National Vaccine Advisory Committee released its annual report on
the state of immunization. See NAT'L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 4, at
1.
54. Id. at 2. Recent flu vaccine shortages further compromised the nation's
immunization in the winter of 2003. See Rob Stein, Concerns Raised Over Supply
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unanticipated shortage of routinely recommended vaccines . .
beginning in 2001, resulting in significant and extended shortages of
routinely administered vaccines .... 5'
The NVAC designated several areas of concern directly affecting the
supply of children's vaccines. Their first concern was the length of
time required by the FDA's approval process.56 Secondly, low profit
margins within the vaccine industry "may have contributed to a
reduction in the number of vaccine manufacturers during the past 25
years. The NVAC also cited the complexity and uncertainty of
developing new vaccines as a direct barrier to entry into the vaccine
market. 8 In addressing the concerns to the shortage problem, the
NVAC noted that stockpiles are the most cost-effective solution to
overcoming certain vaccine shortages. 59
II. STOCKPILING IN ACTION: THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE
With the institution of a pharmaceutical stockpile program in May
1998, the federal government effectively addressed the concern of a
potential terror-related public health emergency, something it has
failed to do with respect to the inadequate supply of childhood
immunization vaccines. 60 By clearly defining stockpiling through
statute and by coordinating between federal and state authorities, the
federal government's terror-related stockpiling program provides an
excellent model on how to address vaccine shortages affecting
childhood immunization.
A. Terror Pre-9/11: The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
of Flu Shots; In Year of Brisk Demand, Vaccine Makers Have Shipped Entire
Inventories, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at A02.
55. NAT'L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 4, at 1.
56. Id. at 4 ("The development of new vaccines may take many years, starting
with the pre-clinical work and progressing through clinical studies that are needed
to establish the safety and efficacy of the product.").
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See infra Part II.A-B.
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In May of 1998, after embassy bombings in Kenya, Uganda, and the
Philippines, coupled with escalated tension in Saudi Arabia, President
Clinton issued a presidential decision directive.
6  The directive
ordered the implementation of a plan to coordinate federal and state
efforts to deter and respond to terrorist attacks on the United States.
62
HHS was given leading authority in planning and preparing a response
to emergencies related to weapons of mass destruction.
63  The
President also required both HHS and the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) to stockpile antidotes and pharmaceuticals "in the event
of a weapons of mass destruction incident."
64
In 1999 Congress appropriated funding for both the presidential
directive and the newly established National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
(NPS). The CDC was assigned the task of implementing the stockpile
initiative, including buying vaccines and assisting state and city
65
planners in planning for terrorist attacks.
Under the NPS program, federal and state governments were
required to collaborate and provide large quantities of medical
supplies to those within the U.S. population suffering from terrorist
attacks. 6 The NPS program was organized to provide state and local
governments with twelve-hour "push packages" that would arrive in
any city in the country within twelve hours through coordination with
the United States Postal Service, Federal Express, and United Parcel
67
Service. These push packages, kept at a dozen undisclosed locations
around the country, contain large packages of drugs, antidotes, and
other medical supplies, including vaccines to protect against anthrax,
plague, tularemia, and nerve agents. 68 In fact, the first use of the NPS





65. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HELPING STATE AND LOCAL
JURISDICTIONS PREPARE FOR A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (August 11, 2003),
available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile (last visited September 21, 2004) ("In
1999 Congress charged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the establishment of
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS).").
66. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RECEIVING, DISTRIBUTING,
AND DISPENSING THE NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL STOCKPILE: A GUIDE FOR
PLANNERS 3 (2002).
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
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was in New York City immediately after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. The NPS push package arrived within seven
hours of the attack.69 The program was initially given a budget of $160
million in 1999. Today the stockpile has a budget of over $600
million.7 °
Implementation of the NPS Program involved intense collaboration
between federal, state, and local government officials.7 ' Locally staffed
command and control centers were established throughout the country
to assist NPS teams and to act as part of a broader state and local
bioterrorism response plan.7 The CDC designated "Technical
Advisory Response Units" to consult with and aid state and local
71authorities to oversee all NPS functions. While the NPS is an
important asset in itself, it serves to support a larger bioterrorism
response plan among local, state, and federal authorities. 4
B. R.LP. NPS: The Creation and Modification of the Strategic
National Stockpile
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a profound impact
on legislation governing pharmaceutical stockpiling, amplifying the
importance of an NPS-type program as part of a larger bioterrorism
response plan. As a result, Congress soon passed the Public Health
69. Id.
70. Compare Bioterrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Health, Education,
Labor & Pensions Committee, Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety, 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement by William Clark, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency
Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("I must say our
medical bioresponse capabilities are limited, but we are using the $160 million
appropriated for Bioterrorism in FY 99 to change that, and the President's FY
2000 budget .... ) with 42 USC § 300hh-12 (describing funding "authorized to be
appropriated [in the amount of] $640,000,000 for fiscal year 2002...").
71. Administrative agencies included in direct implementation included the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and state and local planners.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 66, at 4.
72. See generally id.
73. Id.
74. PDD-62, supra note 12, at 1. The full text of PDD-62 is a classified
document.
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Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002 (Act).
75 The Act not
only granted statutory authority for the NPS, it transformed the NPS
into the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), broadening the program's
purpose and increasing its funding to a level above that outlined in
President Clinton's 1998 directive. The Act, for the first time, defined
stockpile as the "physical accumulation" of medical supplies or
contractual agreements made between the Secretary of HHS and
private entities that would provide supplies.77  The Act further
delineated the purpose of the SNS as "provid[ing] for the emergency
health security of the United States, including the emergency health
security of children and other vulnerable populations, in the event of a
bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency."
78 Under the
broadened purpose of protecting against bioterrorism, the Act
initiated development and accumulation of smallpox vaccines as part
79
of the revamped stockpiling program.
The Act enumerated a number of intergovernmental collaboration
procedures and security measures for the implementation of the SNS
program. The Secretary of HHS was charged with management of the
stockpile in consultation with a "working group" of cabinet level
officials from various executive departments and agencies.n
s Congress
75. The Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2001,
S.1715. repealed by The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 194 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). Although the Act cited in notes 74-89 was repealed, discussion of
the changes it made are important to understand the current stockpile regime.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-12 (2002) (repealed 2004). See id. § 247d-6(b) (2004).
77. Id. § 300hh-12(d) (repealed 2004).
78. Id. § 300hh-12(a)(1) (2002) (repealed 2004). See also 149 CONG. REC. E919
(2002) (enacted) (stating "[s]pecific reference to the needs of children and other
vulnerable populations is included").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-12(b) (repealed 2004).
80. Id. § 300hh-12(a)(2)(A) (repealed 2004). See also id. § 247d-6(a). The Act
defines "Working Group" as:
The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection agency, the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, and with other similar Federal officials as determined
appropriate, shall establish a working group on the prevention,
preparedness, and response to bioterrorism and other public health
emergencies.
Id. § 247d-6(a).
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also delegated to the HHS Secretary the authority to coordinate with
state and local agencies in running the program." Specifically, the
Secretary is to "devise plans for the effective and timely supply-chain
management of the stockpile, in consultation with appropriate federal,
state, and local agencies, and the public and private health
infrastructure."82 Congress also included a security element which bars
any entity from disclosing any information concerning the location of
the stockpile. 83
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four American jetliners
in a coordinated attack and flew them into the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon resulting in the loss of thousands of American lives
and the initiation of a global war on terror.4 Shortly thereafter, the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) via the
Homeland Security Act of 2003 (HSA) significantly affected the newly
created stockpile." The HSA annexed many functions from the HHS,
including the Office of Emergency Preparedness.86 It also amended
the stockpile in many significant ways, including transferring
management of the stockpile to DHS. Specifically, the measure
charged the DHS Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and
Response with the responsibility for directing the stockpile under the
consult of the Secretary of HHS. Both the revamping of the stockpile
81. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-12(a)(2) (repealed 2004).
82. Id. § 300hh-12(a)(2)(E) (repealed 2004).
83. Id. at §300hh-12(a)(2)(F) (repealed 2004).
84. Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on
Highest Alert, WASH. POST, September 12, 2001, at A01.
85. See generally George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security:
Executive Brief, June 2002.
86. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). See also H.R. REP. No.
99-908 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6344.
87. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
88. 6 U.S.C. § 313(6), Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 1705, 116 Stat. 2316 (repealed
2004). Direction of the stockpile is no longer a responsibility of the Under
Secretary, due to the passage of the Project Bioshield Act of 2004. See infra note
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-12 (stating in the amendments to the Code that the
Secretary will now work "in coordination with" the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security), transferred to 41 U.S.C. §247d-6(b) by the Project
Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835, July 21, 2004, then
amended to transfer the stockpile back to HHS. The Secretary of DHS is now in a
consulting position for oversight of the stockpile. Id.
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program and its transfer to the DHS emphasized the government's
commitment to protect against terrorism with stockpiling initiatives.
89
However, the management and authority of the SNS was significantly
altered yet again by Project Bioshield.9
C. Project Bioshield
The management of the SNS program was again significantly altered
through the creation of Project Bioshield. 9 With the recent passage of
the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 ("PBA"), Congress amended the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act to transfer primary control of the SNS back to the Secretary of
HHS. 92  The Secretary of HHS has regained primary authority
regarding the management and maintenance of the stockpile and the
Secretary of DHS has a coordinating role.93
The Project Bioshield Act not only transferred control of the
stockpile back to HHS, it also expanded that agency's duties to include
development of future vaccines.94 The PBA funds the research and
development of new vaccines and other drugs to protect against
biological, chemical, and nuclear national security threats.
95  It
allocates $5.6 billion to encourage research and development of drugs
not yet available96 and authorized the Secretary of HHS to stockpile
89. See supra Part II.B.
90. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 188 Stat. 835 (2004)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
91. Id.
92. See supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 319F-1. See also Press Release, Tauzin Applauds House
Passage of Project Bioshield Act of 2003, at http://energycommerce. house.
gov/108/News/ 07162003_1042.htm.
[Project Bioshield] will encourage the research and development of new
vaccines, drugs, or other countermeasures to deal with those biological,
chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents that pose a material threat to our
national security. This list includes six dangerous agents: small pox,
anthrax, the plague, botulism, hemorrhagic fevers (ebola), and tularemia -
many of which lack any effective treatment or antidote today.
Id.
96. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 188 Stat. 835 (2004)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) See also CBO Predicts
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drugs that are integral to national security, but not yet approved by the
FDA . 7 Today the SNS is a joint collaboration effort involving
numerous federal agencies, state, and local authorities.98 Despite the
many changes and modifications since September 11, 2001, this type of
coordination is an excellent model for childhood immunization
initiatives because of the clarity within the statute and active
participation of state and local authorities.9 In order for HHS to use
stockpiling as a method of addressing childhood immunization
concerns, they must do so through statute.
If HHS acts without congressional authority, several parties may
object. Potential objectors include Congress, and those within HHS
and other administrative agencies who disagree with the disbursement
and use of funds for childhood immunization initiatives. Also, current
vaccine manufacturers are reluctant to see new entrants in the vaccine
market when the current climate allows them to produce vaccines only
when there is dire need and without price competition.'00 Without
clear language in a federal statute granting such authority, HHS will be
Project Bioshield will Cost Over $8 Billion in Next 10 Years, 45 No. 19 GOV'T
CONTRACTOR P 205 (May 14, 2003) [hereinafter CBO Predicts] ("Because several
of these vaccines and treatments are not yet available, the cost of purchasing them
is uncertain . . . [t]o purchase, store, and replace these counter measures, the
Government plans to spend $5.6 billion during the years 2004-2013.").
97. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 188 Stat. 835 (2004)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (amending section
regarding smallpox vaccine development). This authorization will allow
stockpiling of drugs that are integral to national security to circumvent the
approval process.
98. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 65.
To conduct this outreach and training, CDC and SNS Program staff are
currently working with DHS, HHS agencies, Regional Emergency
Response Coordinators at all of the U.S. Public Health Service regional
offices, state and local health departments, state emergency management
offices, the Metropolitan Medical Response System cities, the
Department of Veterans' Affairs, and the Department of Defense.
Id.
99. See infra Part V.A.
100. Manufacturers are reluctant to enter the vaccine market because of a
"wobbly distribution network" that creates surplus in one region and shortages in
another. Industry shortfalls allow manufacturers to only make as much vaccine as
is needed to prevent medical disasters. Bernard Wysocki Jr., Eight Shortages
Since 2000; Fewer Shots for Everything from Tetanus to Chickenpox, WALL ST. J.,
December 8, 2003, at Al.
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forced to rely on the deference granted to the agency when the statute
on which such authority is based is determined to be ambiguous.
III. DEGREES OF DEFERENCE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The authority to promote agency action concerning the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act has been questioned before.'
0 ' If the
HHS were to act on childhood vaccine stockpiling initiatives, judicial
deference may be given to such actions.' 2  When reviewing the
legitimacy of agency determinations, the Supreme Court has
developed an analysis that allows for deference to the agency as an
expert in its field.'03 The following discussion provides a background of
the framework underlying the Supreme Court's approach to reviewing
agency action.
A. The Early Approach to Administrative Interpretation
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court found that light
deference should be given to an interpretation of a statute when made
by an administrative agency.'0 In Skidmore, employees of Swift &
Company brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to
receive compensation for overtime pay and liquidated damages.'
5 The
101. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine
Injury Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678, 7679 (Feb. 8, 1995) (codified as 42 C.F.R. § 100)
(explaining that "[s]everal commenters suggested that the Department had
exceeded its authority in promulgating the regulation"). See also PETER L.
STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 902 (10th ed. 2003).
102. See generally infra Part III.A-B.
103. See also STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 101, at 978 ("Whatever the problems
of reviewing findings of fact, the proper standard of review is far more
controversial when other kinds of 'questions' are under review.").
104. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
105. Id. at 135. As a condition to their oral agreement to employment, the
employees agreed to stay in a fire hall provided by the company to stay on the
premises in case of fire or distress. While there, the men were free to use their
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point of contention was defining "working time" within the Fair Labor
and Standards Act (FLSA).'06 The lower court found that the activities
of the employees did not constitute working time as defined by the
FLSA.'°7  Also, it interpreted congressional intent of the phrase
"working time" as a "conclusion of law," without taking into account
the agency's interpretation.1 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson stated that the
lower court erred by failing to take into account the interpretation that
was given by the agency.' ° The Supreme Court held that the agency's
policies and standards are entitled to respect and review by the court,
despite the fact that they were not created through an adversarial110
process. The Court further stated that while the agency's policies
were "not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
[they] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.' The
Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
reevaluate the agency's interpretation, with some deference to its
interpretation, now that it was not restricted by the "notion that
waiting time may not be work, an understanding of the law which we
hold to be erroneous.'
1 2
B. Modern Review and Deference in Administrative Action
Modern review of administrative agency action is more deferential
than the earlier Skidmore review, granting higher deference to agency
time as they saw fit, so long as they were close to the fire hall and were ready to
respond to alarms.
106. Id. at 163.
107. Id. at 162.
108. Id.
109. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944) ("Instead, it put this
responsibility on the courts . . . [b]ut it did create the office of Administrator,
impose upon him a variety of duties, endow him with powers to inform himself on
conditions in industries and employments subject to this Act . .
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id. ("The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade.").
112. Id.
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positions."3  In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the Supreme Court created a two-step analysis when
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute."
4  In Chevron, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 enumerated requirements for
states that had not "achieved the national air quality standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency ... pursuant to
earlier legislation.""' 5 The case centered on the EPA's interpretation
of the statutory term "stationary source."'1 6 The EPA allowed states to
treat all devices which emitted pollutants "within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single 'bubble.',
1 1 7 The
Natural Resources Defense Council, which thought that such a
position would enable facilities to avoid stringent emissions limitations
and thus hurt the environment, filed suit.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held that when reviewing
an agency's construction of a statute, a court engages in a two-step18
process. The first step analyzes whether Congress has "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue" or whether congressional
intent is unclear. " 9 The Court found that if Congress' intent was clear,
then the analysis is over, and courts should give effect to the
"expressed intent of Congress., 120 However, if Congress explicitly left
a gap in the statute, or congressional intent cannot be determined, the
reviewing court should give "considerable weight" to agency
reguations.
121
In determining whether the agency expressed a proper construction
of the statute, the Court allows "considerable weight" unless the
agency's construction is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). See also the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). For information concerning the impact of
Chevron on administrative action see Thomas W. Merril & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) ("[Chevron has] dramatically
expanded the circumstances in which courts must defer to agency interpretations
of statutes."). The Chevron decision has been seen as "[o]ne of the most
important decisions in the history of administrative law." 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 140 (4th ed. 2004).
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 842.
119. Id.
120. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
121. Id.
156 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 21:137
to the statute.' 22 The Court stated that it is important for courts to
show deference to an administrative agency's construction of a statute
as agencies are entrusted by Congress to execute such legislation.
123
The Court found that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was
reasonable based on congressional legislation and its history.12 As a
result, courts after Chevron gave far more deference to agency action
than did the Skidmore decision.' 25
C. Further Defining Deference: Agency Action with the Force and
Effect of Law
In United States v. Mead Corporation, the Supreme Court found that
not all agency action is entitled to Chevron deference. 126 In Mead, an
importer challenged a custom official's classification of its day planner
notebook products for tariff purposes.12 The Secretary of the Treasury
authorized customs officials to set tariff classifications for particular
imports. 28  Mead challenged the agency's reclassification of its
products from a tariff-free category to one that carried a tariff of four
percent.129  The agency, relying on Chevron, argued that its
reclassification was entitled to heavy deference. However, the Court
held that the agency's tariff ruling would not receive Chevron
122. Id. at 843, 844.
123. Id. at 844.
124. Id. at 845.
125. See generally I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
126. 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001).
127. Id. at 224, 225. Modern deference has also been defined by other Supreme
Court decisions. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 526 (2001). See also
Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of
the Supreme Court's Retreat From Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead,
107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 304 (2002).
The first two major administrative law decisions of the twenty-first century are
also, appropriately, the signal of a new era of lessened judicial deference to
agency interpretations. Christensen and Mead confirmed in judicial precedent
the signals the Supreme Court had given in earlier cases that it was unprepared
to extend Chevron deference to informal agency actions.
Id.
128. Mead, 533 U.S. at 222.
129. Id. at 225.
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deference as Congress never intended to "delegate authority to
Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law."
13
Justice Souter explained that Chevron deference would be triggered
only when Congress delegated authority to make rules "carrying the
force of law. 131 Examples of such delegation include "an agency's
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent."
'32
While the customs rulings fell outside the boundaries of Chevron, the
Court remanded the case to determine whether the tariff ruling should
receive the lower Skidmore standard of deference.133 The Court stated
that "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and
information' available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity
in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires."'' 34  The Mead Court further added that Chevron left
Skidmore intact where the statute does not indicate any intent to
delegate general authority to make rules with the force of law.
135
IV. A SHIFT IN Focus: ANALYSIS OF RECENT LEGISLATION AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
130. Id. at 231-232. Mead has been said to resurrect Skidmore deference for
modern review of agency action. See e.g., Cooley R. Howarth, United States v.
Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 699, 702 (2002); Giacomo Gallai, United States v. Mead Corp.: Will
Administrative Transparency Survive the Increasing Demand for National
Security?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 725, 755 (2003) ("[Mead] effectively enlarges the scope
of operation of the intermediate standard of judicial review between the well-
known de novo standard of review, and the permissive standard adopted in
Chevron. Such a shift is in direct opposition to the post-modernist idea of the role
of the judiciary.").
131. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 234.
134. Id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139).
135. Id. at 238. For an analysis of the application of Mead in the federal circuit,
see Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
347 (2003).
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A. Shifting Stockpiling Resources to Terror-related Public Health
Emergencies
While Congress responded quickly to the threat of biological and
chemical warfare with enactment of the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Response Act and the codification of the Strategic
National Stockpile, stockpiling efforts for childhood vaccines have
fallen behind. 136 These shortages have led some medical experts to
recommend deferrals of vaccine immunization for some in order to
give priority to current at-risk patients until supply can meet the
demand.'37 While the CDC has managed to stockpile a few vaccines,
many supplies have not been brought up to levels appropriate to
ensure adequate immunization protection. 38
In comparison to the Strategic National Stockpile, HHS's stockpiling
of vaccines for childhood immunization has given private industry
neither incentives to enter the market nor provided for the expansion
of vaccine production. Congress has allocated $5.6 billion to
encourage research and development of terrorism-related vaccines
through the Project Bioshield Act, while HHS has received a mere
$700 million for vaccine immunization stockpiling.39 Project Bioshield
provides manufacturers with security by assuring payment in advance
for the development of new terror-related immunization products.'9
Further, the waiver of the FDA approval requirement for drugs and
vaccines created for the SNS gives additional incentive for private
136. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PROGRAM IN BRIEF:
VACCINE STOCKPILE 1 (Feb. 2003) ("These shortages have led [experts] to
recommend deferral of certain immunization and to set priorities for high-risk
patients until supplies of vaccine return to normal."). See Noah, supra note 40, at
374 ("Although the agency continues to maintain the stockpile at its original levels,
the program has stagnated somewhat in the face of resource constraints.").
137. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 136. These
experts include the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the American Academy of Family
Physicians (AAFP).
138. Id. Currently, there is no stockpile for Hepatitis B, Hib, DTap, PCV, and
Hepatitis A vaccines.
139. Id. For an explanation of the projected expenditures on Project Bioshield,
see also CBO Predicts, supra note 96, at 205.
140. See Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 188 Stat. 835 (2004)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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companies to produce terror-related vaccines) 4' None of these
incentives exist for the production of childhood vaccines. Relatively
predictable market conditions are needed to allow a clear path for the
private sector to allocate the necessary time, money, and manpower
required for the development of effective childhood immunization
techniques. 42
B. Lack of Federal Action Has Led to Immunization Shortfalls and a
Reliance on Herd Immunization
The last federally-initiated program fostering entry into the
childhood vaccine market was the Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program in 1983.43 This twenty year gap in federal assistance has
reestablished wariness by private industry to develop and supply
childhood vaccines. 44 While the high visibility and sudden nature of
the September 11th terrorist attacks and the recent anthrax scare
jumpstarted the government into action to address the threat of
terrorism,1 45 the less conspicuous effects of the shortage of childhood
immunization have unfortunately allowed the issue to remain largely
below the government's radar screen.
With the reliance on "herd immunity," whereby parents perceive
that their child is safe from disease because of the immunization of
other children, and lack of public awareness of the importance of
vaccines, many parents find it unnecessary to immunize their
children.146
Reliance on herd immunity, however, involves inherent dangers.
Children have an enormous risk of contracting communicable diseases
when not vaccinated. 47  Recent studies have found that
141. Mark B. McClellan, Analyzing the Laws, Regulations, and Policies
Affecting FDA-Regulated Products, 58 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 191, 204 (2003).
142. Id.
143. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (1986).
144. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 136, at 1
(stating that there is currently no stockpile for Hepatitis B, Hib, DTap, PCV, and
Hepatitis A vaccines).
145. Direct government response to terror threats can be seen with the
Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2002; The Strategic
National Stockpile, 42 U.S.C. §247d-6(b); and Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-
276, 118 Stat. 835.
146. See Strognin, supra note 2, at 3.
147. Id.
160 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 21:137
underimmunization has led to a resurgence of contagious diseases,
such as measles, diphtheria, and pertussis, all of which are easily
preventable through vaccination.148 In 1989, an outbreak of measles in
the U.S. led to one hundred twenty-three deaths.14 9 One hundred
eleven of the deceased children were not vaccinated. A shift in the
allocation of time and money to terror-related public health
emergencies has increased the dangers of vaccine shortages in
childhood immunization. Vaccines for diphtheria, pertussis, chicken
pox, measles, and rubella have all seen supply shortages as recently as
last year15 All had shortfalls due to heightened demand and
production deficiencies."'
C. What if the CDC Acts? Analysis of Judicial Deference Given
Agency Action
Agency interpretation is limited by the scope of the enabling
statute. T5 If the statute has not defined how certain terms should be
construed, however, deference is given to the agency. 55 The HHS
Secretary's authority has previously been questioned concerning the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act.1 56  HHS
instituted notice and comment rulemaking to add vaccines to the
Injury Compensation Table of the NCVIA, thereby compensating
patients who experience grave side effects from vaccination.
15 7
When several vaccines were added to the Injury Compensation
Table, vaccine manufacturers commented that HHS had "exceeded its
authority in promulgating the regulation."'"" HHS responded




151. See infra Part V.A-C.
152. See Wysocki, supra note 100, at Al.
153. Id.
154. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 101, at 902.
155. Id.
156. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine
Injury Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678 (Feb. 8, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100.3)
(2004).
157. Id. See also note 29.
158. Id. at 7679.
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authority delegated to it by Congress, the NCVIA required HHS to
"fill the gaps" in the legislation by disseminating regulations based on
statutory interpretation. 9 HHS maintained that their actions were
entitled to Chevron deference of statutory interpretation.
'6
This Comment addresses whether the HHS Secretary had legal
authority to build a childhood immunization stockpile."' Such
authority is important to combat opposition from other administrative
agencies who take issue with the allocation of funding toward
childhood vaccine stockpiling as well as from vaccine manufacturers.
These manufacturers benefit from the current market through
producing just enough vaccines to meet demand without competition
from new entrants, which would help provide for stockpiling
initiatives.
6 2
The CDC, an administrative agency within HHS, has stated its belief
that statutory authority comes from the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 2003.63 The relevant language of this statute
states:
(6) Assuring adequate supply of vaccines:
The Secretary [of HHS], in negotiations under paragraph (1),
shall negotiate for quantities of pediatric vaccines such that an
adequate supply of such vaccines will be maintained to meet
unanticipated needs for the vaccines. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, the Secretary shall negotiate for a 6-month
supply of vaccines in addition to the quantity that the Secretary
otherwise would provide for in such negotiations. In carrying out
this paragraph, the Secretary shall consider the potential for
outbreaks of the diseases with respect to which the vaccines have
been developed.' 64
To determine whether the HHS's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable in the face of potentially ambiguous language, the courts
159. Id.
160. Id. See also Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
161. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 136, at 1
("The HHS Office of General Counsel has reviewed the legal authority of the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act [of] 1993 legislation and confirmed the Secretary's
authority under current law to build a VFC stockpile equal to the amount needed
for the U.S. pediatric population for 6 months for routinely recommended
vaccines.").
162. See supra note 100.
163. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396s.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s.
162 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 21:137
need to first categorize the agency action under a Chevron analysis.'
Here, Congress' clear intent to authorize the promulgation of
stockpiling vaccines by HHS is evident in the text of the statute.
Congress intended the Secretary of HHS to assure adequate supply to
meet an unanticipated need for vaccines for a six-month period. If
courts find this to be true, no deference would be granted as Congress
has explicitly stated the authority granted to the Secretary.'6
However, if the statute is interpreted to have a "gap" because the
word "stockpile" is omitted from the statute, the next step in the
analysis would be to define the agency action which in turn determines
the degree of deference that would be granted: Chevron "high"
deference or a "light" Skidmore deference. 67 The point of contention
then centers around which level of deference applies to this agency
action. 168 As the action of stockpiling childhood vaccines is neither
formal adjudication nor notice and comment rulemaking, the question
becomes whether it falls under the category of "some other indication
of a comparable congressional intent" where agency action would have
"the force and effect of law."'
69
Unless the HHS looks to stockpile through enacting regulations,
which would require notice and comment rulemaking procedures,
congressional intent could not be construed to have stockpiling carry
the "force and effect of law."' 70 Chevron deference is only given if the
agency has gone through notice and comment rulemaking, formal
adjudication, or some other type of agency action that was intended to
have the "force and effect of law.' ' 71 This language would allow for
lower Skidmore deference, which gives courts the responsibility of
taking into account an agency's expertise and function in determining
whether the agency's action was appropriate. 7 2 A court may perceive
the nexus too large, thereby increasing the likelihood of the stoppage
of childhood immunization programs because of questions concerning
statutory authority.
165. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
166. Id.
167. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 101.
168. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
169. Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
170. Id.
171. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
172. See Skidmore. 323 U.S. at 137.
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V. POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO VACCINE STOCKPILING FOR
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION
Stockpiling is an excellent solution to childhood immunization
concerns, but it is not clearly defined by statute, leaving HHS to
speculate on its stockpiling authority. 7 1 Without direct authority or a
defined organizational structure, child vaccine stockpiling cannot reach
its full potential. 7 4 The Strategic National Stockpile, in contrast, has
clearly defined stockpiling through statute and provides an excellent
model of how to approach childhood immunization concerns.
A. The Strategic National Stockpile: An Ideal Model
The government construction of the Strategic National Stockpile
serves as an excellent model for childhood vaccine stockpiling.'
Congress provided codification through legislation that gives direct
statutory authorization for the administration of the stockpile.'76 The
statute also provides for exact standards in terms of duties and
responsibilities between the various administrative agencies.
177
Another key feature of the statute is its explicit requirement of
cooperation among federal, state, and local entities.7 8 The precise
definitions and exacting construction contained in the Strategic
National Stockpile statute require little need for statutory
interpretation.7 9 This clear congressional intent has allowed all parties
involved to understand their roles in implementing and managing the
stockpile. Because Congress has integrated DHS into the management
of the stockpile, HHS and the CDC will be hard pressed to use the
stockpile's enabling statute as authority for its own childhood vaccine
collection measures, as the Stockpile's purpose is for terror-related
threats rather than childhood vaccine shortages.
173. See supra note 161.
174. See supra Part IV.C.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6(b).
176. Id.
177. Id. These standards include ensuring adequate procedures are followed
with respect to inventory management, consultation with federal, state, and local
officials, take into consideration the timing and location of special events.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6(b).
179. See Merril & Hickman, supra note 114.
180. Cf Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 86.
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In managing the stockpile, federal agencies provide state and local
planners the necessary centralization of resources in their preparations
for responses to chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. Of particular
importance is the statutory requirement to ensure "the emergency
health security of the United States, including the emergency health
security of children and other vulnerable populations ... .,,18' As
children and other vulnerable populations that would benefit
immensely from federally implemented stockpiling of vaccinations for
immunization, the language in the statute underscores the importance
of federal vaccine stockpiling initiatives. Federal, state, and local
government officials should look to the SNS as a model of how to
implement such a program, whether through agency action, regulation
or statute.
B. Agency Action
Agency action is currently the method by which the CDC
administers stockpiling initiatives."" This method could be bolstered
through greater involvement from state and local officials, similar to
the command and control centers of the Strategic National Stockpile.
Private industry already plays a strong role as they have provided the
government with estimates of product availability and production
183procedures. Experts have recommended additional measures such as
compulsory licensing, where the government would force patent
holders to allow the use of their drugs by others in exchange for a fixed
royalty 84 While agency action is more quickly implemented than
regulation or legislation, it leaves open the possibility for reversal or
stoppage of initiatives due to court review or interference from the
executive branch. Direct agency action would receive light Skidmore
deference, as the agency did not undergo notice and comment
rulemaking or any other action that would have the force and effect of
law, thus leaving a greater chance of program stoppage.
18
1
181. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6(b).
182. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 136, at 1.
183. Id.
184. See Noah, supra note 40, at 344.
185. See Howarth, supra note 130, at 701 ("The Court then states that judicial
deference is due to agency action only when Congress has authorized the agency to
make new rules with the force of law by means of that decisionmaking [sic]
format.") Many experts believe that the Supreme Court can further define the
boundaries of deference, as Professor Howarth further states that "the Court
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C. Regulation: Notice and Comment Rulemaking
HHS could establish vaccine stockpiles by regulation through notice
and comment rulemaking procedures 86 The question arises, however:
from where would they derive their statutory authority? While the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act makes references to a
distribution function within the defined goals of the National Vaccine
Program, courts may give minimal deference due to the lack of
congressional intent in allowing HHS to promulgate regulations that
have "the force and effect of law" concerning the National Vaccine
Program! 1  As discussed previously, the 1993 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act is cited by the CDC as providing statutory
authority for stockpiling. But again, the statute is vague in defining
effective purchase and distribution functions with respect to vaccines,
and never explicitly states any "stockpiling" initiatives."' If HHS is
able to show a court that Congress has explicitly left a gap in the
statute to allow HHS to create stockpiling initiatives, then Chevron
"high" deference would apply to the agency's actions in this regard. 89However, if no gap exists, lighter Skidmore deference would apply.1 9
D. Congressional Legislation
Enacting a childhood immunization stockpiling statute is the most
direct and efficient way of implementing a stockpiling initiative.
Although the CDC currently utilizes the Vaccine for Children
Program for childhood vaccine stockpiling, too little funding and too
would do well to clarify whether the 'force of law' test is the sole criterion for
Chevron deference or whether, instead, the interpretation/lawmaking distinction is
also relevant, if only in part, to the Chevron doctrine." Id. at 717.
186. The Department of Health and Human Services has used regulation before
with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. See 42 C.F.R. § 100.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34. See also Mead, 533 U.S. at 219.
188. See Project Bioshield Act, supra note 140.
189. See supra Parts III.A.-C.
190. Id.
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many responsibilities have rendered the program deficient. 9 ' A
congressional mandate explicitly defining the responsibilities of all
parties involved and directly authorizing the disbursement of funds is
needed to efficiently allocate government and private resources for the
purpose of childhood vaccine stockpiling. Such a statute could be
codified within the context of the National Vaccine Program, with
specific guidelines and procedures involving the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee.9
A direct congressional mandate with defined terms and goals would
also alleviate current concerns regarding legal authority. While the
CDC has claimed authority under provisions within the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 to engage in its childhood vaccine
stockpiling activities, the "gap" in the relevant statutory language
leaves this authority subject to interpretation. '9' A well-drafted
enabling statute having no "gap" would allow judicial review of an
agency action to look to the statute itself for its plain meaning, and if
ambiguous, to legislative history and statutory construction for
interpretation, thus circumventing the second step of the Chevron
analysis.'94 Once a court found that Congress' intent was clear, no
further Chevron analysis would be necessary. As a result, courts would
give effect to the "expressed intent of Congress" and, in doing so, clear
the way for the implementation of a much needed childhood vaccine
stockpiling initiative.'9
CONCLUSION
The Government's swift response to terror threats is evidenced by its
implementation of the Strategic National Stockpile. This stockpile
should serve as a model to address domestic childhood vaccine
shortages. After September 11, 2001, the nation redefined a public
health emergency to include biological and chemical terror threats, but
long-term public health concerns involving the deficiency of non-
terror-related immunizations still linger. Although failure to immunize
191. See Vaccine for Children Program, at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vfc/Default.
htm (last visited February 23, 2004). See also CTRS, FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, supra note 136, at 1.
192. See 42 U.S.C.§§ 300aa-3; 300aa-5.
193. Cf Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, supra note 47.
194. Chevron deference only applies when an agency applies notice and
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, where Congress has "delegated"
authority to the agency to "promulgate legislative rules implementing a statute ...
" Merril & Hickman, supra note 114, at 874.
195. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. See also supra Part III.B.
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does not pose the direct and immediate threat that a terrorist attack
does, the long-term ramifications of inadequate childhood
immunization could be just as severe. Based on the successful
coordination among federal, state, and local authorities in
implementing the Strategic National Stockpile, a similar stockpiling
initiative, with direct authority from federal statute is needed. Such an
initiative would provide an effective solution to the crises of childhood
vaccine shortages in America.
